ing the maximum average linear hull probability (MALHP) for SPNs, a value which is required to make claims about provable security against linear cryptanalysis. Application of this method to Rijndael (AES) yields an upper bound of UB = 2 ?75 when 7 or more rounds are approximated, corresponding to a lower bound on the data complexity of 32 UB = 2 80 (for a 96.7% success rate). In the current paper, we improve this upper bound for Rijndael by taking into consideration the distribution of linear probability values for the (unique) Rijndael 8 8 s-box. Our new upper bound on the MALHP when 9 rounds are approximated is 2 ?92 , corresponding to a lower bound on the data complexity of 2 97 (again for a 96.7% success rate). This is after completing 43% of the computation; however, we believe that values have stabilized|see Section 7.]
Introduction
The substitution-permutation network (SPN) 9,1,12] is a fundamental block cipher architecture based on Shannon's principles of confusion and di usion 22] . These principles are implemented through substitution and linear transformation (LT), respectively. Recently, SPNs have been the focus of increased attention. This is due in part to the selection of the SPN Rijndael 6] as the U.S.
Government Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
Linear cryptanalysis (LC) 18] and di erential cryptanalysis (DC) 4] are generally considered to be the two most powerful cryptanalytic attacks on block ciphers. In this paper we focus on the linear cryptanalysis of SPNs. As a rst attempt to quantify the resistance of a block cipher to LC, the expected linear characteristic probability (ELCP) of the best linear characteristic often is evaluated. However, Nyberg 21] showed that the use of linear characteristics can underestimate the success of LC. To guarantee provable security, a block cipher designer needs to consider linear hulls instead of linear characteristics, and the maximum average linear hull probability (MALHP) instead of the ELCP of the best linear characteristic.
Since the MALHP is di cult, if not infeasible, to compute exactly, researchers have adopted the approach of upper bounding it 2,13,15]. In 15], Keliher et al. present a new general method for upper bounding the MALHP for SPNs. They apply their method to Rijndael, obtaining an upper bound on the MALHP of UB = 2 ?75 when 7 or more rounds are approximated, corresponding to a lower bound on the data complexity of 32 UB = 2 80 (for a 96.7% success rate|see Table 1 ). 1 The current paper is based on the following observation: the general method of Keliher et al. in 15] can potentially be improved by incorporating speci c information about the distribution of linear probability (LP) values for the SPN s-boxes. Due to the fact that Rijndael has only one (repeated) s-box, and because of the structure of this s-box, this observation applies readily to Rijndael, and allows us to improve the upper bound on the MALHP to UB = 2 ?92 when 9 rounds are approximated, for a lower bound on the data complexity of 2 97 (again for a 96.7% success rate). (This value is based on completion of 43% of the computation, although we believe that the values have stabilized|see Section 7.
Conventions
The Hamming weight of a binary vector x is written wt(x). If Z is a random variable, E Z] denotes the expected value of Z. And we use #A to indicate the number of elements in the set A.
Substitution-Permutation Networks
A block cipher is a bijective mapping from N bits to N bits (N is the block size)
parameterized by a bitstring called a key, denoted k. An SPN encrypts a plaintext through a series of R simpler encryption steps called rounds. (Rijndael with a key size of 128 bits consists of 10 rounds.) The input to round r (1 r R) is rst bitwise XOR'd with an N-bit subkey, denoted k r , which is typically derived from the key, k, via a separate key-scheduling algorithm. The substitution stage then partitions the resulting vector into M subblocks of size n (N = Mn), which become the inputs to a row of bijective n n substitution boxes (s-boxes)|bijective mappings from f0; 1g n to f0; 1g n . Finally, the permutation stage applies an invertible linear transformation (LT) to the output of the s-boxes (classically, a bitwise permutation). Often the permutation stage is omitted from the last round. A nal subkey, k R+1 , is XOR'd with the output of round R to form the ciphertext. Figure 1 depicts an example SPN with N = 16, M = n = 4, and R = 3.
We assume the most general situation for the key, namely, that k is an independent key 3], a concatenation of (R + 1) subkeys chosen independently from the uniform distribution on f0; 1g N |symbolically, k = k 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; k R+1 . We use K to denote the set of all independent keys. In this section, and in Section 4, we make use of some of the treatment and notation from Vaudenay 23 
Markov Ciphers
Let E : f0; 1g N ! f0; 1g N be an R-round cipher, for which round r is given by the function y = r (x; k r ) (x 2 f0; 1g N is the round input, and k r 2 f0; 1g N is the round-r subkey). Then E is a Markov cipher with respect to the XOR group operation ( ) on f0; 1g N if, for 1 r R, and any x, x, y 2 f0; 1g N , Prob K f r (x; K) r (x x; K) = yg = Prob K;X f r (X; K) r (X x; K) = yg (2) (where X and K are uniformly distributed and independent). That is, the probability over the key that a xed input di erence produces a xed output di erence is independent of the round input.
It is easy to show that the SPN model we are using is a Markov cipher, as are certain Feistel ciphers 10], such as DES 8].
Remark 1. The material in the remainder of Section 4 applies to any Markov cipher. Although we are dealing with LC, which ostensibly does not involve the operation, the relevance of the Markov property given in (2) is via an interesting connection between linear probability and di erential probability (see, for example, equations (3) and (4) 
Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis (LC) is a known-plaintext attack (ciphertext-only in some cases) introduced by Matsui 18] . The more powerful version is known as Algorithm 2 (Algorithm 1 extracts only a single subkey bit). Algorithm 2 can be used to extract (pieces of) the round-1 subkey, k 1 . Once k 1 is known, round 1 can be stripped o , and LC can be reapplied to obtain k 2 , and so on.
We do not give the details of LC here, as it is treated in many papers 18, 3, 14, 15] . It su ces to say that the attacker wants to nd input/output masks a; b 2 f0; 1g N for the bijective mapping consisting of rounds 2 : : :R, for which LP(a; b; k) is maximal. Based on this value, the attacker can determine the number of known hplaintext; ciphertexti pairs, N L (called the data complexity), required for a successful attack. Given an assumption about the behavior of round-1 output 18], Matsui shows that if
then Algorithm 2 has the success rates in Table 1 , for various values of the constant, c. Note that this is the same as Table 3 Notational Issues Above, we have discussed input and output masks and the associated LP values for rounds 2 : : :R of an R-round cipher. It is useful to consider these and other related concepts as applying to any T 2 consecutive \core" rounds (we say that these are the rounds being approximated). For Algorithm 2 as outlined above, T = R ? 1, and the \ rst round," or \round 1," is actually round 2 of the cipher.
We use superscripts for individual rounds, so LP t (a; b; k t ) and ELP t (a; b) are LP and ELP values, respectively, for round t. On the other hand, we use t as a subscript to refer to values which apply to the rst t rounds as a unit, so, for example, ELP t (a; b) is an ELP value over rounds 1 : : :t. The implicit assumption is that LP T It follows immediately from Theorem 1 that (4) does not hold in general, since ELP T (a; b) is seen to be equal to a sum of terms ELCP( ) over a (large) set of characteristics, and therefore, in general, the ELCP of any characteristic will be strictly less than the corresponding ELP value. This is referred to as the linear hull e ect. An important consequence is that an attacker may overestimate the number of hplaintext; ciphertexti pairs required for a given success rate. Remark 3. It can be shown that the linear hull e ect is signi cant for Rijndael, since, for example, the ELCP of any characteristic over T = 8 rounds is upper bounded by 2 ?300 6], 3 but the largest ELP value has 2 ?128 as a trivial lower bound. 4 The next lemma follows easily from Theorem 1 and De nition 2 (recall the conventions for superscripts and subscripts). 
Linear Characteristics
is su ciently small that the resulting data complexity is prohibitive for any conceivable attacker. 5 The value in (5) is also called the maximum average linear hull probability (MALHP). We retain this terminology for consistency with 15]. Since evaluation of the MALHP appears to be infeasible in general, researchers have adopted the approach of upper bounding this value 2,13,15]. If such an upper bound is su ciently small, provable security can be claimed.
SPN-Speci c Considerations
In the current section, we adapt certain results from Section 4 to the SPN model. Note that where matrix multiplication is involved, we view all vectors as column vectors. Also, if M is a matrix, M 0 denotes the transpose of M. 
From the above, any characteristic 2 ALH(a; b) determines an input and an output mask for each s-box in rounds 1 : : :T. If this yields at least one s-box for which the input mask is zero and the output mask is nonzero, or vice versa, the linear probability associated with that s-box will trivially be 0, and therefore ELCP( ) = 0 by (6) Also, we de ne S A to be the sequence 14.
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It is not hard to see that the value UB 2 ;^ ] computed in Figure 2 is exactly
For computational e ciency, we do not sum \element-by-element" (i.e., for each i), but instead take advantage of the fact that f c i g has the form ; : : : : 
It follows that 
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For The value (9) is exactly the upper bound computed in Figure 3 . We argue similarly to the T = 2 case. Since f c i g and f d i g are derived from sequences which consist of groups of consecutive identical elements (the sequence in (7) and S`, respectively), the algorithm operates group-by-group, not element-byelement. Beginning at Line 10, the variable h is the index of the current group in f c i g (having element value U h and size W h ). Function NextTermT() identi es the corresponding elements in f d i g, and computes the equivalent of the elementby-element product.
If the terms in f c i g (resp. f d i g) shrink to 0 because the corresponding terms in (7) (resp. S`) become 0, the check (U h > 0) (resp. ( < 1)) in Line 11 or Line 15 will fail, and the algorithm will exit. The check ( + (U h W h ) > 1) in Line 15 detects the case that in the derivation of f c i g from f _ u i g above,
and therefore f c i g is based on the truncated sequence in (8).
Computational Results
We estimate that running the above algorithm to completion will take up to 200,000 hours on a single Sun Ultra 5. We are currently running on about 50 CPUs, and have completed 43% of the computation for 2 T 10.
It is worth noting that in progressing from 11% to 43% of the computation, there was no change in the upper bound for 2 T 10. Combined with our experience in running the algorithm of 15], for which the numbers also stabilized quickly, we expect that the nal results will be the same as those presented below.
In Figure 4 , we plot our improved upper bound against that of 15] for 2 T 10. Note that the new bound is noticeably superior to that of 15] for T 4. When T = 9 rounds are being approximated, the upper bound value is UB = 2 ?92 . For a success rate of 96.7%, this corresponds to a data complexity of 32 UB = 2 97 ( Table 1 ). The corresponding upper bound value from 15] is 2 ?75 , for a data complexity of 2 80 . This represents a signi cant improvement in the calculation of the provable security of Rijndael against linear cryptanalysis.
We also plot very preliminary results for 11 T 15, in order to gain a sense of the behavior of the upper bound (for these values of T, we have completed only 1.5% of the necessary computation, hence the label \Extrapolation"). Unlike the upper bound in 15], the new upper bound does not appear to atten out, but continues a downward progression as T increases. 
Conclusion
We have presented an improved version of the algorithmgiven in 15] (which computes an upper bound on the maximumaverage linear hull probability (MALHP) for SPNs) in the case of Rijndael. The improvement is achieved by taking into account the distribution of linear probability values for the (unique) Rijndael s-box. When 9 rounds of Rijndael are approximated, the new upper bound is 2 ?92 , which corresponds to a lower bound on the data complexity of 2 97 , for a 96.7% success rate. (This is based on completion of 43% of the computation. However, we expect that the values obtained so far for 2 T 10 core rounds will remain unchanged|see Section 7.) This is a signi cant improvement over the corresponding upper bound from 15], namely 2 ?75 , for a data complexity of 2 80 (also for a 96.7% success rate). The new result strengthens our con dence in the provable security of Rijndael against linear cryptanalysis.
